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Individuals tend to judge bad side effects as more intentional than good side effects (the Knobe or side-
effect effect). Here, we assessed how widespread these findings are by testing eleven adult cohorts of
eight highly contrasted cultures on their attributions of intentional action as well as ratings of blame
and praise. We found limited generalizability of the original side-effect effect, and even a reversal of
the effect in two rural, traditional cultures (Samoa and Vanuatu) where participants were more likely
to judge the good side effect as intentional. Three follow-up experiments indicate that this reversal of
the side-effect effect is not due to semantics and may be linked to the perception of the status of the pro-
tagonist. These results highlight the importance of factoring cultural context in our understanding of
moral cognition.
 2017 Published by Elsevier B.V.1. Introduction
The ability to distinguish between intentional and non-
intentional action is an essential component of social cognition
(Malle, Moses, & Baldwin, 2001). In general, intentional harms
are judged more harshly than unintentional harms (Cushman,
2008; Cushman, Sheketoff, Wharton, & Carey, 2013; Young,
Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, 2007). Intention-based moral evalua-
tions and third party preferences are early developmental facts,
observable in babies younger than 12 months (Hamlin, 2013;
Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007; Nobes, Panagiotaki, & Pawson,
2009). Some researchers have argued that the relation between
attributions of intentional action and moral evaluations, either
positive or negative, is an innate principle of our moral psychology,
part of a ‘‘universal moral grammar” (Mikhail, 2007). As a case in
point, in U.S. criminal law and the codes of most other cultures,
intentional harms tend to be judged more severely than non-
intentional harms (Fletcher, 1998; Green, 2000). In the U.S.,
manslaughter is associated with lesser penalties (10–16 months
in prison), whereas the federal sentence for murder ranges from
19.5 years in prison to a mandatory life sentence (Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines Manual §2A1.1–§2A1.4). The punishment is differ-
ent, even though the absolute outcome of the crime is the same.Likewise, the severity of our moral judgments depends in general
on our ascription of relative intention behind the offense.
Recent research in psychology and philosophy draws a complex
picture of the relation between attribution of intentional action
and moral evaluation. For example, numerous findings report that
people are much more likely to judge that bad outcomes are
brought about intentionally compared to good outcomes, the so-
called side-effect effect or Knobe effect (original research by
Knobe, 2003a, 2003b, 2005, 2006, 2010; Knobe & Mendlow,
2004; see additional studies by Cova & Naar, 2012; Cushman &
Mele, 2008; Ditto, Pizarro, & Tannenbaum, 2009; Lanteri, 2012;
Nadelhoffer, 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2006; Pellizzoni, Girotto, &
Surian, 2010; Sousa & Holbrook, 2010; Wright & Bengson, 2009).
The side-effect effect has been claimed to reflect deep and funda-
mental facts about human cognition. However, these claims often
occur in the absence of considerations of culture and context.
Our approach here is cross-cultural. The general rationale guiding
our study is that if these effects are truly intrinsic and pervasive
facts about our moral psychology, they are likely to be universal
and should hold outside the predominantly W.E.I.R.D. (White Edu-
cated Industrialized, Rich and Democratic) populations tested to
date (Henrich, Heine, & Norensayan, 2010). The question is
whether these phenomena might hold across a wide range of cul-
tures, as implied by many moral theorists studying the side-effect
effect and allied phenomena.
In the original Knobe (2003a) study, participants were
presented with one of two scenarios. Both scenarios involved a
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company profits. The only thing that differed between the two sce-
narios was the goodness or badness of a foreseen side effect of the
chairman’s decision, specifically whether the environment was
helped or harmed as a result of the decision. After reading the sce-
nario, participants were asked whether the chairman intentionally
harmed (or helped) the environment and whether the chairman
deserved blame (or praise) for harming (or helping) the environ-
ment. Knobe’s results were striking: Eighty-two percent of partic-
ipants said that the chairman intentionally harmed the
environment, while only 23 percent said the chairman intention-
ally helped the environment. In response to the blame/praise ques-
tion, participants strongly agreed that the chairman deserved
blame for harming the environment, but that the chairman did
not deserve praise for helping the environment. The author also
found a strong, positive correlation between attributions of inten-
tional action and judgments of blame/praise.
The tendency to attribute intentions to negative but not positive
outcomes (the side-effect effect) has been observed across a wide
variety of methodologies. This asymmetry in intentional action
attributions has been replicated with other scenarios (Knobe,
2003b; Knobe & Mendlow, 2004; Mallon, 2008; Nadelhoffer,
2004a, 2006; Shepard & Wolff, 2013; Uttich & Lombrozo, 2010;
Wright & Bengson, 2009), with children as young as four years
(Lesle, Knobe, & Cohen, 2006), with participants who suffer from
deficits in emotional processing due to lesions in the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (Young, Cushman, Adolphs, & Hauser, 2006), and,
for at least some versions of the scenarios, with adults with high
functioning autism or Asperger’s (Zalla & Leboyer, 2011; Zalla,
Machery, & Leboyer, 2010). The asymmetry has also been reported
with word changes in the original script introducing varying con-
cepts such as intention and intending (McCann, 2005), deciding,
being in favor of, advocating for (Pettit & Knobe, 2009), knowledge
(Beebe & Buckwalter, 2010), belief (Beebe, 2013; Tannenbaum,
Ditto, & Pizarro, 2007), awareness (Tannenbaum et al., 2007)
remembering (Alfano, Beebe, & Robinson, 2012), and desire
(Guglielmo & Malle, 2010; Tannenbaum et al., 2007).
In general, these findings have been interpreted to suggest that
our concept of intentional action, along with other theory of mind
concepts, is fundamentally moral or morally driven (Knobe, 2005)
and that this role is deep and pervasive (Knobe, 2005, 2006, 2010).
Further support for such moral underpinnings comes from the fact
that there is a pervasive asymmetry in the ratings of blame and
praise (Knobe, 2003a).
In all, the question is whether such asymmetries do actually tell
us anything fundamental about the way we think about moral
evaluations, intentional action, and their relation. In other words,
we ask whether the side-effect effect is truly universal or might
vary across cultures. To our knowledge, a limited number of
cross-cultural comparisons have yielded contrary findings. Knobe
and Burra (2006) replicated the side-effect effect in a sample of
61 US college Hindi-speaking students in South Asian clubs at
Princeton University and Yale University using a Hindi translation
of the original script, but a more recent comparison of US partici-
pants and Indian participants tested in either Hindi or English sug-
gests a reversed side-effect effect, whereby Indian participants
judged helpful acts as more intentional than harmful ones (Clark,
Bauman, Kamble, & Knowles, 2017). The explicit claims, and often
implicit assumptions, of the side-effect effect as being intrinsic to
human cognition require further scrutiny. To further address the
question of how universal these effects are, we assessed them
across eleven cohorts of adults amongst eight highly contrasted
cultures (Study 1). In a series of follow-up experiments, we demon-
strate that inversions of the side-effect effect may be linked to per-
ceptions of status (Studies 2–4).2. General method
A convenience sample of 464 participants (253 female) between
the ages of 14–90 (M = 31.39, SD = 13.40 years) completed the
study. Table 1 summarizes the demographic information for each
of the eleven cohorts and their corresponding eight different cul-
tures. Participants were recruited and tested individually in public
spaces (e.g., public park, company break room) by experimenters
who were residents of the area and fluent in the local language,
or who were non-natives assisted by local informants fluent in
both English and the local language. In all cultures, the vignettes
and follow-up questions (described in detail below and reproduced
in the Supplemental Materials) were translated and back-
translated by independent research assistants who were native
speakers of the local language and also fluent in English. The trans-
lated vignettes were then presented to participants in written for-
mat and read aloud by the experimenter or her assistant. At test,
participants indicated their responses to the experimenter, who
recorded them on a coding sheet. Participants who could not
answer prompts probing for story comprehension were excluded
from analysis, yielding an attrition rate of 2% collapsed across all
cultures.
In two conditions (harm versus help), we assessed whether
judgments of intentional action, as well as ratings of either blame
or praise, depended on the framing of a story in which a protago-
nist makes a decision about an agricultural policy that will increase
community profits, but with consequences for the local environ-
ment and crops. This protagonist (either a CEO or village High Chief
depending on culture) represents an individual recognized as hav-
ing decision-making power and social ascendance. They represent
a supreme authority in economic decisions. In this sense, the
responsibilities of CEO and Chief overlap. In the vignettes, a subor-
dinate approaches the protagonist with a suggestion about how to
increase profits. In the ‘‘harm” condition, this suggestion will
increase profits but also damage the environment. In the ‘‘help”
condition, this suggestion will increase profits and also improve
the environment. In both conditions, the protagonist responds by
saying that his only concern is maximizing profit, and that he does
not care at all about the effect on the environment. The suggestion
is adopted, and the vignette ends with the environment being
either harmed or helped. Crucially, the vignettes differ only in
the effect (help or harm) that the suggestion will have on the envi-
ronment (see Supplemental Materials). Note that the well-being of
the local environment was a moral concern for all cultures, and
particularly so for our subsistence-based populations (see
O’Meara, 1990; Shore, 1982, and Vienne, 1984 regarding the South
Pacific but also Cusack & Dixon, 2006; Dahlquist et al., 2007, and
Polidoro et al., 2008 regarding environmental practice in Central
America).
Following the story, participants answered two questions. The
first question asked participants to determine how much praise
(help condition) or blame (harm condition) the protagonist
deserves on a seven-point Likert scale, with zero indicating none
and six indicating a lot. Across culture and conditions, participants
tended to make full use of the scale. The second question asked
participants whether they thought the leader intentionally helped
or harmed the environment (coded as yes or no). Although other
versions of the paradigm have used continuous measures for this
judgment of intentional action, we elected to use a dichotomous
outcome because intentional action is typically construed as binary
(i.e., either someone acted intentionally or they did not) and in
order to keep the question simple by avoiding an agree-disagree
scale.
Table 1
Demographic highlights of the eleven cohorts across eight cultures.
Country Region Setting Environment SES status Population highlights Design
USA 1
(N = 60)
New York
City
Public
Space
Urban Middle/High Mixed ethnicity and income;
Age = 18–78 years, M = 38.91,
SD = 14.28 years, 30 females
Between Subjects (Harm Condition:
N = 30, Help Condition: N = 30)
USA 2
(N = 25)
Metro-
Atlanta
University Urban Middle/High Predominantly Caucasian
undergraduate students; Age = 19–
25 years, M = 20.71, SD = 1.52 years,
13 females
Between Subjects (Harm Condition:
N = 12, Help Condition: N = 13)
USA 3
(N = 56)
Metro-
Atlanta
University Urban Middle/High Predominantly Caucasian
undergraduate students; Age = 18–
50 years, M = 20.20, SD = 5.21, 30
females
Within Subjects (all participants
completed both help and harm
conditions)
USA 4
(N = 60)
Metro-
Atlanta
University Urban Middle/High Predominantly Caucasian
undergraduate students; Age = 18–
65 years, M = 24.77, SD = 10.28, 35
females
Within subjects (all participants
completed both help and harm
conditions)
Samoa
(N = 73)
Faga,
Savai’i,
Polynesia
Village Rural, chief system,
traditional, collectivistic
and highly hierarchical
(matai) system.
Very Low Adults of a subsistence living village
with a population of approximately
500; Age = 14–65 years, M = 30.48,
SD = 13.46 years, 38 females
Within-Subjects (all participants
completed both help and harm
conditions)
Vanuatu
(N = 67)
Motalava,
Banks
Island,
Melanesia
Village Rural, chief system,
traditional, collectivistic
and egalitarian
Very Low Adults of a highly insular and isolated
subsistence living village with a
population of approximately 1000;
Age = 17–90 years, M = 32.56,
SD = 15.43 years, 42 females
Within-Subjects (all participants
completed both help and harm
conditions)
Costa Rica
(N = 21)
Talamanca Village Rural, chief system,
traditional, matrilineal,
collectivistic
Very Low Adults of a traditional BriBri village
depending heavily on external aide
with a population of approximately
300; Age = 15–70 years, M = 40.00,
SD = 15.28, 10 females
Between-Subjects (Harm Condition:
N = 9, Help Condition: N = 12)
Mexico 1
(N = 16)
Chiapas Custapec Rural Low Chiapas-born Mexican employees
working and living on an isolated
coffee plantation; Age = 15–55 years,
M = 36.31, SD = 12.61, 6 females
Within-subjects (all participants
completed both help and harm
conditions)
Mexico 2
(N = 17)
Chiapas Custapec Rural Low/Very
Low
Guatemalan migrant workers
seasonally employed and temporarily
living on an isolated coffee
plantation; Age = 15–55 years,
M = 25.00, SD = 11.60, 7 females
Within-subjects (all participants
completed both help and harm
conditions)
South
Korea
(N = 34)
Seoul Public
Space
Urban Middle/High Adults of mixed income; Age = 21–
61 years, M = 36.21, SD = 10.79 years,
21 females
Between-subjects (Harm condition:
N = 18, Help Condition: N = 16)
Honduras
(N = 35)
San Pedro
Sula
Workplace Urban Middle/High Adults of a Korean-owned company
working in Honduras; Age = 21–
57 years; M = 34.43, SD = 8.46, 21
females
Between-subjects (Harm-condition:
N = 18, Help Condition: N = 17)
Note: Experiment 1 included all populations but the USA 3 and USA 4 cohorts; only a subset of participants in Samoa (N = 27) and Vanuatu (N = 34) additionally completed
Experiment 2. Experiment 4 included only participants from the USA 4 cohort.
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3.1. Method
In Experiment 1 (N = 348 participants), the decisions described
in the vignette were enacted by a protagonist described as either
the CEO of an organization (USA 1, USA 2, Mexico 1, Mexico 2,
South Korea, and Honduras) or alternately as the High Chief of a
village (Samoa, Vanuatu, and Costa Rica) to reflect local leadership
conventions (see Supplemental Materials). Half of the participants
(N = 175 from five populations: USA 1, USA 2, Costa Rica, Honduras,
South Korea) received only one condition (i.e., either help or harm).
The other half of participants (N = 173 from four populations: Mex-
ico 1, Mexico 2, Samoa, and Vanuatu) were tested successively in
both conditions (help and harm) in a counterbalanced order. This
within-subject manipulation opportunistically allowed us to assess
whether potential asymmetries between judgments of intentional
action and praise/blame ratings noted at a group level might also
hold within individuals.3.2. Results
In an initial analysis, and in order to compare the nine popula-
tions directly, we considered only responses to the first vignette
read by the participant (harm or help). We first compared the pro-
portion of participants who judged the protagonist’s action as
intentional. Results indicate a significant joint influence of culture
and condition (help or harm) on judgments of intentionality
(v2 = 14.37, df = 1, p < 0.001, Cramer’s V = 0.167). In follow-up
tests, the majority of cultures demonstrated either a significant
(USA 1, USA 2, Mexico 1, South Korea; all p < 0.01 based on Fisher’s
exact tests) or marginal tendency (Costa Rica, Mexico 2, Honduras)
to ascribe intentionality to the protagonist in the harm but not the
help condition (Fig. 1). This asymmetry was inverted significantly
in Samoa (p < 0.01) and to a lesser extent in Vanuatu (p = 0.096)
where participants tended to judge the protagonist’s actions as
intentional in the help but not the harm condition. These results
indicate that the original Knobe report of an asymmetry in judg-
ments of intentionality between harm versus help conditions does
Fig. 1. Percentage of participants in each culture who judge the action to be
intentional in the harm and help conditions. Asterisks denote significant differences
between conditions based on Fisher’s exact tests; ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01.
Table 2
Correlations between judgments of intentional action and ratings of blameworthiness
(harm condition) and praiseworthiness (help condition) as a function of population.
Population Harm Help Overall
USA 1 0.658*** 0.343 0.681***
USA 2 0.463* 0.248 0.443*
Costa Rica 0.172 0.367 0.308
Mexico 1 –a –b 0.907***
Mexico 2 –a 0.477 0.296
Korea 0.629*** 0.338 0.643***
Honduras 0.515* 0.388 0.571***
Samoa 0.252 0.325*** 0.310**
Vanuatu 0.260 0.529*** 0.412***
Total 0.325*** 0.520*** 0.488***
Note: All coefficients represent Spearman correlations between the intentional
action and rating variables.
a Values represent a constant; all participants judged the protagonist as inten-
tionally harming the environment.
b Values represent a constant; all participants judged that the protagonist did not
intentionally help the environment.
* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01.
*** p < 0.001.
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tional action are more common in the help condition.
Regarding the Likert scale ratings of praise or blame, a univari-
ate ANOVA factoring condition (2) and culture (9) as between-
subjects factors yielded a significant interaction of condition and
culture (F(7, 269) = 8.573, p < 0.01, g2 = 0.182). Participants in
USA 1, USA 2, Costa Rica, Mexico 1, and South Korea gave signifi-
cantly greater ratings of blame than praise (all p < 0.05 based on
two-tail pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni-adjustments). In
contrast, participants in all other cultures showed either no differ-
ence between these two conditions (Mexico 2 and Honduras), or
demonstrated a slightly inverted trend toward higher praisewor-
thiness (Fig. 2).
We also analyzed the association between intentional action
and blame/praise ratings, following the observation in the original
Knobe study (2003) these variables were strongly positively corre-
lated. A Spearman correlation yielded a significant relationship
between judgments of intentional action and praise ratings
(rs = 0.520, N = 178, p < 0.001). The same positive association heldFig. 2. Mean ratings for blame (in the harm condition) and praise (in the help
condition) as a function of culture. Asterisks denote significant pairwise compar-
isons between conditions (two-tailed with Bonferroni corrections), ***p < 0.001,
**p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Bars represent ±1 SEM.for judgments of intentional action and blameworthiness ratings
(rs = 0.325, N = 166; p < 0.001). Table 2 below reports the results
of this analysis for each population. As seen in the table, the
strength of the association is not equal across populations. For
some populations, an association exists only between intentional
action and blame (USA 1, USA 2, Mexico 1, Mexico 2, Honduras,
and South Korea; all p < 0.05), as for others no association exists
at all (Costa Rica). Finally, in the two South Pacific populations,
an association exists only between judgments of intentional action
and praise ratings (both p < 0.001).
These results partially confirm the original side-effect effect
reported in the Knobe (2003a) study that was conducted with only
U.S. participants. In our data, a sample of participants in Mexico 2
demonstrated no contrast between ratings of praise or blame, and
participants in Samoa and Vanuatu even trended toward an inver-
sion of the phenomenon. Furthermore, the correlation between
intentional action and praise/blame ratings is markedly different
across cultures.
In a subsequent analysis we examined the relative consis-
tency of individual responses for the subset of participants
(N = 173) in Mexico 1, Mexico 2, Samoa, and Vanuatu who
opportunistically received both help and harm vignettes. We first
examined whether or not participants demonstrated the side-
effect effect by changing their judgment of intentional action
between help and harm conditions. Results yielded a significant
effect of culture (v2 = 24.57, df = 3, p < 0.001, Crammer’s
V = 0.380). A significant majority of participants in Mexico 1
(100%) and Mexico 2 (82.4%) changed their attributions of inten-
tional action between the two conditions (both p < 0.01),
whereas only half of Samoan (50.7%) and Ni-Vanuatu (42.4%)
participants did the same. Examining only the participants who
changed their responses, we next compared the proportion of
participants who showed the asymmetry reported by Knobe
(2003a) by judging actions as intentional in the harm but not
the help condition. We observed a significant effect of popula-
tion (v2 = 18.75, df = 3, p < 0.001, Crammer’s V = 0.487). When
they changed their responses, a significant majority of partici-
pants in Mexico 1 (100%) and Mexico 2 (92.9%) judged that
the protagonist intentionally hurt the environment in the harm
condition and did not intentionally improve the environment
in the help condition (both p < 0.01 based on two-tailed binomial
tests). Only a small minority of the Samoans (27%) and Ni-
Vanuatu (35.7%) participants showed this same tendency. In
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(respectively 72.6% and 64.3%) judged that the protagonist did
not intentionally harm the environment in the harm condition,
but that he did intentionally help the environment in the help
condition (both p < 0.01 based on two-tailed binomial tests).
Note that no order effects were found for judgments of inten-
tional action in any culture.
We also analyzed individual consistency with regard to the rat-
ings of praise and blame. A mixed-design ANOVA factoring condi-
tion (2), population (4), and condition order (2) yielded a
significant interaction of condition and population (F(3, 162)
= 23.98, p = 0.001, g2 = 0.308). There was no order effect on praise
and blame ratings. In follow-up tests of this the interaction, we
found that participants in Mexico 1 and Mexico 2 gave significantly
higher ratings in the harm condition (both p < 0.001), whereas par-
ticipants in Samoa and Vanuatu once again showed an inverted
tendency to provide significantly higher ratings in the help condi-
tion (both p < 0.05). In short, participants in Mexico 1 and 2 gave
significantly greater ratings of blameworthiness compared to our
two South Pacific populations, who gave significantly greater rat-
ings of praiseworthiness.
In all, the results of Experiment 1 partially replicate the orig-
inal side-effect effect noted by Knobe (2003a). We confirm the
findings for both judgments of intentional action and ratings
of blame and praise with participants in USA 1 and USA 2, as
well as Mexico 1 and South Korea. We partially replicate the
phenomenon with one of the variables (i.e., with intentional
action or ratings of blame/praise, but not both) in Costa Rica,
Mexico 2, and Honduras. The partial replication of the inten-
tional action question may have resulted in part from our
choice to measure this outcome dichotomously, which may
have undercut our ability to fully detect an effect in these small
samples. Finally, we observed a tendency toward an inversion
of the side-effect effect in both South Pacific samples, particu-
larly in the significant within-subjects comparison of help and
harm conditions. The within-subject analysis of participants
attests to the consistency of the original side-effect effect in
Mexico 1 and Mexico 2, and demonstrates the robustness of
the inverted effect in Samoa and Vanuatu. Finally, the correla-
tion between intentional action and praise/blame ratings is
markedly different across cultures.
4. Experiment 2
To control for potential differences in the meaning and title of
the protagonist in the vignette used in small-scale societies (e.g.,
Samoa, Vanuatu, and Costa Rica), we ran a second experiment with
US participants using the same labeling (e.g., High Chief) to
describe the authority figure in the story. The rationale for this sec-
ond experiment was that if participants were engaged in moral
reasoning per se, the change in labeling of the authority figure from
CEO to Chief should not affect the side-effect effect observed in the
US participants of Experiment 1. Inversely, if differences in seman-
tics drive the effect, we reasoned that the asymmetry between
blame and praise conditions should either change or disappear.
We expected the former.
4.1. Method
We tested an additional cohort of 56 American participants (see
USA 3 in Table 1) with the English translation of the script used in
these societies and that replaced CEO with High Chief (see Supple-
mental Materials). In a within-subjects design, participants
answered both the intentionality and blame/praise rating ques-
tions for both help and harm conditions in a counterbalanced
order.4.2. Results
Following the analysis of Experiment 1, we initially considered
only responses to the first vignette read by the participant (harm or
help). With regard to the intention question, we observed a signif-
icant effect of condition (Fisher’s exact test: p < 0.01). Confirming
the side-effect effect, 82.1% of participants in the harm condition
judged the actions of the high chief as intentional, whereas only
14.3% of participants judged the action as intentional in the help
condition.
Regarding the Likert scale ratings of praise or blame, an inde-
pendent samples t-test yielded a significant effect of condition (t
(54) = 6.56, p < 0.01, Cohen’s d = 1.79). Consistent with the side-
effect effect, ratings were significantly higher in the harm condi-
tion (M = 5.04, SD = 1.07) than the help condition (M = 2.61,
SD = 1.64).
We also analyzed the within-subject consistency of the side-
effect effect. A significant majority of participants (N = 40, or
71%) changed their judgment of intentional action between condi-
tions (two-tailed binomial test: p = 0.002). Of these participants, a
significant majority (N = 38/40, or 95%) demonstrated the side-
effect effect by judging that the High Chief acted intentionally in
the harm but not the help condition (two-tailed binomial test:
p < 0.01). No order effects were noted. Regarding the Likert scale
ratings of praise and blame, a mixed-design ANOVA factoring con-
dition (2) as a repeated factor and condition order (2) as a
between-subjects factor yielded only a significant main effect of
condition (F(1, 54) = 49.10, p < 0.01 g2 = 0.476). Within-subjects,
participants gave significantly higher ratings in the harm condition
(M = 4.77, SD = 1.07) relative to the help condition (M = 2.61,
SD = 1.71).
A final analysis demonstrates that the magnitude of the side-
effect effect is comparable across the three samples of American
participants. Considering only responses to the first vignette (help
or harm), an independent chi-square test yielded no effect of
cohort on judgments of intentional action. In the harm condition,
the majority of participants in USA 1 (80.0%), USA 2 (91.7%) and
USA 3 (82.1%) found the protagonist’s actions to be intentional,
whereas in the help condition, participants in USA 1 (30%), USA 2
(23.1%), and USA 3 (14.3%) were equally unlikely to say the protag-
onist acted intentionally. Overall, collapsed across cohort, a signif-
icant majority (82.9%) of US participants judged the protagonist as
acting intentionally in the harm condition, whereas only 22.5% of
participants judged the act as intentional in the help condition
(v2 = 51.43, df = 1, p < 0.001, Crammer’s V = 0.604), proportions
that mirror Knobe’s original findings. With regard to the ratings
of blame and praise, and considering only responses to the first
vignette, a univariate ANOVA factoring cohort (3) and condition
(2) yielded only an effect of condition (F(1, 135) = 79.25, p < 0.01,
g2 = 0.370). Across cohorts, participants gave significantly higher
ratings in the harm condition (M = 4.85, SD = 1.33) than in the help
condition (M = 2.30, SD = 1.68). These findings attest to the robust-
ness of the side-effect effect, which appears to be equally strong
across samples of U.S. participants who differ markedly in their
demographic features, including age, race, and education level.
Furthermore, the magnitude of the side-effect effect is comparable
amongst cohorts even when changing the labeling of the authority
figure in the vignette. Participants tended to provide similar ratings
of blame and praise as well as judgments of intentional action
whether the protagonist was depicted as a CEO or village High
Chief.
Collectively, these results replicate what we found with a com-
parable sample of participants in Experiment 1. We thus confirm
that semantic difference between CEO and high chief does not
impact the moral reasoning of the participants. Both scripts elicit
the side-effect effect originally demonstrated by Knobe (2003a).
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In another follow-up experiment, we examined two factors that
could potentially drive the inversion of the side-effect effect noted
in the South Pacific. As a working hypothesis, and to explore fur-
ther the cross-cultural variability found in Experiment 1, we rea-
soned that because these two small-scale societies emphasize
deference to authority and are characterized by highly visible
and transparent delegations of power (O’Meara, 1990; Triandis &
Gelfand, 1998), attributions of intentional action as well as blame
and praise ratings would depend on the status of the protagonist.
In particular, we anticipated that for these two cultures, attribu-
tions of intentional action, as well as ratings of praise and blame,
should be higher in scenarios depicting the actions of a commoner
versus a chief. The additional manipulation of gender was explora-
tory, probing any effect of the differential status of women in Van-
uatu, where gender roles are more segregated (Rivers, 1914),
compared to Samoa, where women are more active in the Samoan
chief (matai) system of governance (Shore, 1982).
5.1. Method
Participants (N = 61) were tested on both the original harm and
help vignettes, as well as a second set of vignettes featuring protag-
onists varying in gender and status. Specifically, a subset of the
Samoan (N = 27) and Ni-Vanuatu (N = 34) participants who read
both vignettes (harm and help) about the chief in Experiment 1,
also read two more help and harm vignettes involving a protago-
nist who was either a male or female commoner. Therefore, in this
mixed-design, participants received in a counterbalanced order a
set of two vignettes (help and harm) about the High Chief, plus a
set of two vignettes (help and harm) about a commoner (i.e., an
individual that was not a Chief) identified as either a man or a
woman (see Supplemental Materials). For our dependent mea-
sures, for each vignette participants made the same judgments of
intentional action and ratings of blame or praise described
previously.
5.2. Results
In a first set of analyses, we assessed whether judgments of
intentional action depended on the gender of the story protagonist.
A chi-square test of independence compared the proportion of par-
ticipants who judged the act to be intentional as a function of cul-
ture, condition (help and harm), and protagonist gender, yielding
no significant results. Across culture and conditions, participants
were at chance in judging whether a woman (62.6%) or a man
(66.7%) acted intentionally. The gender of the commoner did not
appear to influence determinations of intentional action in either
condition for either culture.
We also analyzed the Likert ratings of blameworthiness and
praiseworthiness in a mixed-design ANOVA including condition
(help and harm) as a within-subjects factor and culture (2) and
gender (2) of the story protagonist as between-subjects factors.
Results yielded only a marginal main effect of condition that is
consistent with our previous findings (F(1, 57) = 3.25, p = 0.077,
g2 = 0.054). Independent of culture and the gender of the story
protagonist, participants tended to give higher praise ratings in
the help condition (M = 4.79, SD = 2.00) than blame ratings in the
harm condition (M = 3.95, SD = 2.48). Since we observed no effect
of gender on either of our dependent measures, responses for the
male and female vignettes are subsequently collapsed for all anal-
yses reported below.
Next we assessed whether participants judged intentional
actions differently for a Chief versus a commoner (independent
of gender). A chi-square test of independence compared the pro-portion of participants who judged the act as intentional as a func-
tion of population, condition, and status. Results yielded a
significant joint influence of these three factors (v2 = 28.62,
df = 3, p < 0.01, Cramer’s V = 0.345). In follow-up tests, for each cul-
ture we compared the proportion of participants who judged the
actions as intentional as a function of condition and status. We
observed that in both populations, in the harm condition partici-
pants were equally likely to attribute intentional action to the chief
or the commoner. However, in the help condition, significantly
more participants in both Samoa and Vanuatu judged that the
Chief acted intentionally (92.3% and 88.6%, respectively) compared
to the commoner (42.3% and 55.9%, respectively; both p < 0.01
based on Fisher’s exact tests). These results replicate the findings
of Experiment 1, but only when the protagonist in the story is in
a position of authority and leadership (i.e., a chief).
Finally, we examined the rating responses in a mixed-design
ANOVA including condition (help and harm) and status (chief ver-
sus commoner) as within-subjects factors and population as a
between-subjects factor. Results yielded a significant interaction
of condition and status (F(1, 55) = 3.51, p = 0.047, g2 = 0.060). In
follow-up tests, across cultures we found that in the harm condi-
tion (p = 0.008), participants gave significantly higher ratings to
the commoner (M = 5.08, SD = 1.52) than the chief (M = 3.84,
SD = 2.46), indicating that they found the actions of the commoner
to be significantly more blameworthy. In contrast, in the help con-
dition, participants across culture gave significantly higher ratings
to the chief (M = 5.04, SD = 1.81) than the commoner (M = 4.81,
SD = 2.03), indicating that they found the actions of the chief to
be significantly more praiseworthy (p = 0.034).
Consistent with our hypotheses, the results of Experiment 3
suggest that the inversion of the side-effect effect observed in
the South Pacific may be driven by perceived status of the protag-
onist. We observed more judgments of intentional action and
greater ratings of praiseworthiness in the help condition, but only
when the protagonist was described as a chief. In contrast, in the
harm condition judgments of intentional action did not vary across
protagonist status, although Likert ratings of blameworthiness
were higher for commoners compared to the chief. In sum, the sta-
tus (but not gender) of the protagonist appears to be a significant
factor in both judgments of intentional action and moral evalua-
tion in these two rural, traditional cultures.
6. Experiment 4
To ascertain further the role of perceived status as determinant
of the side-effect effect, in a final experiment, we tested a new
cohort of participants (USA 4) on both the harm and help vignettes,
this time changing the protagonist’s label from CEO to co-worker.
The aim was to reproduce in the USA with college students what
we manipulated in both Samoa and Vanuatu comparing vignettes
involving either a commoner or a High Chief. We expected that if
status is indeed a determinant factor, we should find that describ-
ing the protagonist as co-worker instead of CEO in the USA should
have a mitigated effect on the side effect-effect. In short, despite
the reported cultural variations, we expected to find some influ-
ence of status in the USA regarding attribution of intent and ratings
of either blame or praise.
6.1. Method
Participants (N = 60, see Table 1) read a modified version of
both the original harm and help vignettes, presented in a counter-
balanced fashion across participants, in which the protagonist was
described as a co-worker in the company, implying that they were
not in a position of power. Gender neutral language was used to
describe the characters in the vignette. For our dependent mea-
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of intentional action and ratings of blame or praise described
previously.
6.2. Results
A Fisher’s exact test comparing the proportion of participants
who judged the act to be intentional as a function of condition
(help and harm) yielded significant results that confirm the origi-
nal side effect-effect (p < 0.001). Overall, 15% of participants judged
the co-worker’s action to be intentional in the help condition, com-
pared to 53.3% in the harm condition. The same significant asym-
metry was found in ratings of praise or blame based on an paired
samples t-test (t(1, 59) = 7.09, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.85). On aver-
age, the magnitude of praise ratings (M = 2.28, SD = 1.57) tended to
be significantly less than blame ratings (M = 4.32, SD = 1.55).
Within subjects comparisons show that a significant majority of
participants demonstrated such an asymmetry (93%, binomial test
p < 0.001). We observed no effect of order on either of these trends.
To further examine status as a factor, in a second set of analyses,
we compared these data with those obtained from the USA 2
cohort who were the most similar in terms of demographics and
who, in a between-subjects design, received either the help or
harm vignettes with a CEO rather than a co-worker as protagonist.
In this analysis, to ensure greater comparability between cohorts,
we considered only the first vignette USA 4 participants received
(either blame or praise). Regarding attributions of intention, a Fish-
er’s exact test yielded a significant effect of protagonist status (CEO
versus co-worker) for the harm (p = 0.017) but not the help condi-
tion. In the help condition, a minority of participants in both
cohorts judged the actions of the protagonist as intentional, no
matter their status (23.1% for USA 2 and 22.2% for USA 4, respec-
tively). However, in the Harm condition, when the protagonist is
portrayed as a CEO (USA 2 cohort), 91.7% of participants judged
the protagonist as acting intentionally. In contrast, when described
as a co-worker (USA 4 cohort), 51.5% of the participants judged the
action as intentional. However, the effect of protagonist status did
not extend to the ratings of blame and praiseworthiness. Results
failed to yield a significant condition-by-status interaction, and
only a main effect of condition (help versus harm) was noted (F
(1, 81) = 20.37, p < 0.001, g2 = 0.201). Independent of status, par-
ticipants gave significantly higher ratings in harm (M = 4.51,
SD = 1.63) than in praise (M = 2.47, SD = 2.06) conditions. There-
fore, the effect of status is not evident in relation to ratings of
blameworthiness or praiseworthiness.
Overall, the results of Experiment 4 show that amongst US par-
ticipants, changing the status of the protagonist tends to mitigate
the side-effect effect, although not cancelling it. As hypothesized,
we found that significantly more participants tended to attribute
intentionality to harm the environment when the protagonist is
described as CEO as opposed to co-worker, here construed as hav-
ing less power status in enacting decisions within the portrayed
institution.
7. Discussion
In small-scale, collectivist, and ‘‘face-to-face” societies (Fiske,
Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998; Greenfield, Keller, Fuligni, &
Maynard, 2003), high-ranking status arguably carries different
meanings compared to the high-ranking status of CEOs in urban
industrial and more individualistic (W.E.I.R.D.) societies. Blaming
a high chief has different consequences in the former, as determina-
tions of blame often carry with them the implicit consequence of
punishment or correction. As noted by Hofstede, Hofstede, and
Minkov (2010), individuals of societies like Samoa and Vanuatu that
are highly allocentric and collectivistic have significantly lessautonomy in enacting authoritative decisions (e.g., punishing a
transgressor), an action that is more typically the prerogative of
high ranking Chiefs. This could explain our findings of an inversion
of the side-effect effect in Samoa and Vanuatu, whereby individuals
tend to see more intentional action in the help condition and pro-
vide higher ratings of praiseworthiness. The fact that such an inver-
sion does not extend to vignettes in which the protagonist is a
commoner provides additional direct support to this interpretation.
Noteworthy and further validating these findings is the fact that
in a previous field trip research at these remote locations a few
years prior, we tested over a hundred participants on the Knobe
script with a high chief as protagonist and found the same inverted
tendency toward higher ratings of praise. We could not include this
previous body of observations in the present analysis as we acci-
dently omitted asking the intentional action judgment question.
Based on the collected praise/blame ratings, this original testing
confirms what is presented here, likely to be a real phenomenon
and not an experimental fluke. Furthermore, it is also doubtful that
the reported cross-cultural variability is due to semantic differ-
ences considering that Samoan and Ni-Vanuatu languages are pro-
foundly different. If it were just a semantic by-product in these
small-scale societies, the difference found with commoners in both
would be unlikely. Finally, a differential understanding of harm to
the environment across culture cannot account for our results
since we do not observe an inversion of the side-effect effect in
the two Mexican cohorts or Costa Rican sample that all depend
on natural resources and agriculture for their survival (Cusack &
Dixon, 2006; Eakin et al., 2014; Jurjonas, Crossman, Solomon, &
Baez, 2016; Moguel & Toledo, 1999).
The results of Experiment 2 further dismiss the possibility that
semantic differences in the labeling of the authority figure drive
the cultural variations of the side-effect effect observed here. The
reported findings thus are likely linked to cultural differences in
reasoning about intentional action and not to experimental or
semantic artifacts. However, in relation to our interpretation, there
is one caveat in the fact that in Costa Rica, where participants were
also from a small-scale chief system society, we did not find the
inversion of the phenomenon observed in both Vanuatu and
Samoa. In addition to the small sample size at this locale, one
should note that in Costa Rica, there is considerable influence
and economic aid coming from a stable and highly Westernized
central government in the form of agroforestry, commercial food
production, schooling, medical aid, and ecotourism (Cusack &
Dixon, 2006; Dahlquist et al., 2007; Polidoro et al., 2008), all of
which directly impact how the Bribri population manages their
land as part of assigned indigenous reservations. In contrast,
although subsistence crops are also linked to the well-being, liveli-
hood, and cash economy of many regions in the South Pacific
(O’Meara, 1990; Shore, 1982), much of the economic aid to Samoa
and Vanuatu comes in the form of remittance inflows and foreign
aid targeted toward infrastructure development (Allen, 2000;
Jayaraman & Ward, 2006; Kumar, Naidu, & Kumar, 2011;
McGregor, Bourke, Manley, Tubuna, & Deo, 2009).
The cultural variations in the side-effect effect reported here are
also reinforced by the fact that evidence of such variations are
based on both between and a within-subject comparisons for the
subset of participants in Samoa, Vanuatu, Mexico 1, and Mexico
2 (Experiment 1), as well as USA 3 (Experiment 2). A similar
mixed-design was used by Nichols and Ulatowski (2007) to assess
the robustness of the side-effect effect, with data demonstrating
that the asymmetry between greater ratings and judgments of
intentionality for blame versus praise holds within individual par-
ticipants. Here, however, we confirmed that the inversion of this
side-effect effect in Samoa and Vanuatu exists in both the between
and within subject comparison. Once again, this testifies to the
robustness of our reported findings.
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protagonist can mitigate the side-effect effect across all the tested
populations. Experiment 2 and 4 yield some evidence of differen-
tial attribution of intentionality depending on the status of the pro-
tagonist (High Chief and CEO versus commoner and co-worker).
Consistent with recent findings that religious beliefs attenuate
the side-effect effect (Clark et al., 2017), our data suggest that cul-
tural differences in motivation to blame or praise may influence
judgments of intentional action.
However, although status seems to play an important role in
participants’ judgments of intentionality, it is not clear what status
might mean across such highly contrasted cultures (USA versus
Samoa and Vanuatu). Future research is needed to specify the
extent to which participants across cultures share the same stereo-
types regarding status of authority and leadership within their
group. In particular, it is possible that the inversion of the side-
effect effect reported here might primarily rest on stereotypes of
authority and leadership in decision making that are unique to
those small scale traditional Melanesian and Polynesian cultures.
For example, in Vanuatu and Samoa there are particularly elabo-
rated rituals of gifting and systems of reciprocity through which
individuals may accrue influence, prestige, and transcendence
(O’Meara, 1990; Shore, 1982; Vienne, 1984). It is indeed possible
that in those cultures what participants are primarily basing their
judgments on is a different perception of power rather than a fun-
damental difference in construing the relation between intentional
action and moral evaluation, as it is often presumed in the side-
effect effect. Likewise, the mitigating effect of status found with
the US sample of Experiment 4 could also rest on the stereotype
of CEOs harboring anti-environmental attitudes (see for example
Sripada, 2012; Sripada & Konrath, 2011). In addition, chieftain sys-
tems of governance in the South Pacific are based on traditions that
are strongly cohesive and multigenerational. There may therefore
be a degree of shared understanding and consensus about leader-
ship in these societies that is qualitatively different than the Wes-
tern context of high market integration and large corporations
with broader distribution of leadership making it harder to delin-
eate authority relationships.
Inversions of the side-effect effect have been previously
linked to contextual factors such as the explicitness of the moral
norms that are violated in the vignette (Robinson, Stey, & Alfano,
2015), or whether the participant is an agent or observer of the
unintended consequence (Feltz, Harris, & Perez, 2012). Based on
our data, it is difficult to determine the extent to which partici-
pants in the South Pacific may have aligned themselves with the
story protagonist, and whether thinking of themselves as benefi-
ciaries of the protagonist’s action might have made them more
inclined to attribute intention to the chief’s action in the help
condition. However, if something about living in small-scale, col-
lective, traditional, and/or rural societies lent itself to such pro-
jective perspective-taking or immersive thinking, we might also
expect to observe similar effects in the Costa Rican or even Mex-
ican populations, which is not the case. Further research could
help disambiguate these possibilities. Finally, we do not believe
that potential cultural differences in understanding of intentional
action can fully explain our results. The classic side-effect effect
is observed across a wide array of theory of mind concepts,
including several variants of intent and belief (McCann, 2005;
Beebe & Buckwalter, 2010; Guglielmo & Malle, 2010). To our
knowledge, none of these articulations of desire or belief states
evoke the inversion of the side-effect effect noted here. In sum-
mary, although our results do not account directly for the mech-
anisms linking intentional attribution and moral judgments of
praise or blame, they show that factoring status can help disso-
ciate these two dimensions and thus could help in figuring out
those mechanisms in future research.8. Conclusions
Using the original Knobe paradigm, we find an inversion of the
side-effect effect in two small-scale, traditional societies of the
South Pacific. Our findings suggest that the widely documented
asymmetry between judgments of intentional action and moral
evaluations is not necessarily unidirectional. Cultural beliefs about
moral actions may influence how people perceive unintentional
consequences, with both praise and blame influencing judgments
of intentional action (Clark et al., 2017).
Our results raise a number of interesting questions. If the rela-
tionship between moral evaluation and judgments of intentional
action can be multi-directional, as our findings suggest, how can
we predict what circumstances will increase or decrease blame
attributions? Alicke, Davis, Buckingham, and Zell (2008) point to
a ‘‘culpable control” model in which participants evaluate causal
information alongside the favorability of the outcome or actors.
Assignations of blame may be made when an agent is perceived
as controlling a negative outcome (as in the harm condition), but
also if evidential information suggests that an actor is dislikeable
or is shown to be negligent (as might be the perception following
the protagonist’s casual disregard for the environment). On the
other hand, if the information about the actors or consequences
is positive enough, it may even override contradictory evidence
(e.g., a thriving economy or environment may be enough to deem-
phasize the cavalier attitude of the protagonist). Culture may influ-
ence judgments of intentional action not only by defining what
acts are considered helpful versus harmful, but also perhaps by set-
ting the threshold for how negative outcomes or agents must be
before they are considered blameworthy (Alicke et al., 2008). Our
findings may also call to question the assumption that transcultur-
ally, punitive measures carry higher instrumental value than
reward (Henrich et al., 2006). That some cultures differentially
emphasize praise over punishment may be consistent with an
emerging literature demonstrating cultural variation in the ten-
dency to engage in punitive versus restorative justice following
violation of a fairness norm (Robbins & Rochat, 2011). Understand-
ing the relationship between moral evaluation and judgment of
intentional action may have wide-reaching implications for how
we understand and reform our criminal justice systems.
In sum, we interpret our data to suggest that although the ten-
dency to engage in moral evaluations is ubiquitous—we all engage
in judgments about other people—rationalization for these judg-
ments is likely context specific. More research is needed to specify
further what cultural factors influence such evaluations. The cul-
tural differences noted here point to the central importance of tak-
ing context seriously when theorizing about moral reasoning.Acknowledgements
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